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At the 1978 AAAS meeting in Washing-
ton, a group of enthusiasts poured a jug of
water over the head of Edward Wilson,
castigating him as a racist and fascist.
Many of my scientific colleagues were ap-
palled; to them, real scientists simply do
not behave in this manner. They accepted
the image of science as expressed by Louis
Pasteur when he wrote: <<No religion, no
philosophy, no atheism, no materialism,
no spiritualism, belong in science>> (1). It is
not surprising that they view science in
this way. It is part of the image of science
conveyed to them by their teachers and by
the textbooks that they read. Scientists, we
are told, deal only in facts and the objec-
tive assessment of such facts. Their life as
scientists must be totally divorced from
their social, political, and theological life
outside of science; the one must not im-
pinge on the other.
To such people the current controversy
over Sociobiology is not a scientific debate
at all. It arose, they argue, because a group
of leftwing radicals and even Marxists
found the views of Wilson and others to be
utterly incompatible with their political
ideology. Thus, instead of debating the is-
sue on its scientific merits, they chose to
dismiss Sociobiology by labelling its adher-
ents as racists and fascists - the modem
descendants of Social Darwinists and Eu-
genicists (2).
To those who have become enthralled
by the history of science, this political con-
troversy over Sociobiology is not an abnor-
mal situation at all. It may well be primar-
ily a political debate, but contentious is-
sues in the history of science have very
often involved such non-scientific factors.
One cannot separate social, theological,
philosophical and political issues from the
history of science without contorting the
true picture. Whether this is good or bad is
beside the point; history must attempt to
deal with what exists, not with what should
exist. To portray the history of science as a
narrative of discoveries by objectively
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minded scientists rigourously applying the
scientific method , and to ignore the extra-
scientific issues that may have been in-
volved, is, in my way of thinking, to por-
tray a completely inaccurate picture.
One must also be honest with oneself.
Many years ago the great French physiolo-
gist Claude Bernard remarked:
It is impossible to devise an experiment without
a preconceived idea, devising an experiment, lie
said, is putting a question ; we never conceive a
question without an idea which invites an
answer . I consider it, therefore, an absolute prin-
ciple that experiments must always he devised in
view qfa preconceived ideal. (3).
Neither can historians of science approach
their subject without preconceived ideas.
To even believe that extra - scientific factors
can impinge on science may well reflect
certain political preconceptions of the be-
liever. Persons of left-wing leanings are
prone to stress the interplay of social forces
in history and to underplay the influence
of individuals and their ideas . Indeed, it
also has been argued that the idea of
science as an ideology-free discipline, ad-
vancing solely through discoveries of
individual scientists, is itself a reflection of
Western middle - class values.
This, of course , presents a problem. Pre-
cisely because both views of the history of
science may have political overtones, and
thus it becomes very difficult to engage in
any meaningful dialogue. It must be ad-
mitted , however , that although there has
been a great deal of rhetoric generated
about the interplay of social forces in
science, very few case histories exist which
detail such influences . One of the best is
Paul Foreman ' s study of physicists in Wei-
mar Germany (4), and I believe also that
the history of the spontaneous generation
controversy and debates on the origin of
life also provide substantial evidence in fa-
vour of such interpretations (5).
Before I discuss these controversies, I
should state that I believe non - scientific
factors have influenced science in three
broad areas. First, and with this there can
be little disagreement, such factors have
influenced the quantity and quality of
scientific output. The quantitative produc-
tion of 19th Century German scientists,
and the type of work they did, cannot be
understood without reference to the re-
search laboratories in the German univer-
sities, which had no counterparts any-
where else in the world until the end of the
century. Likewise, the place of science in
the fabric of 19th Century British society
explains why their science differed so mar-
kedly from that of the Germans. One can
hardly imagine The Origin of Species be-
ing written by anyone other than a British
naturalist. In more recent times the inter-
est in food-chains resulted from concern
with radioactive fall-out, and how could a
future historian ever explain the modern
explosion in ecological research without
reference to the Western concern with pol-
lution?
Beyond this, however, the status of non-
scientific factors becomes a matter of con-
troversy. Do such factors also influence the
choices scientists make between conflicting
scientific theories? Do they even influence
the formulation of these theories them-
selves? To answer such questions in the
affirmative, as I do, demands proof.
After 1859 scientists were faced with a
series of choices over the theory of evolu-
tion and the origin of life. For in one of
those freakish accidents, the year that Dar-
win published his Origin of Species was
also the very year when Louis Pasteur be-
gan his attacks on the theory of spontan-
eous generation. Herein lay the dilemma:
if one accepted that life evolved by natural
causes then one must also, to be consistent,
accept that life arose by natural causes,
namely by a spontaneous generation. But
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at the very time when the evolutionary
theory was growing in popularity, the pos-
sibility of spontaneous generation seemed
more and more remote. How could one ex-
tricate oneself from such a dilemma?
In general terms the British, French and
Germans reacted to this problem in very
different ways, suggesting thereby that cul-
tural factors were involved. If there were
indeed an international <<republic of
science», then surely no such marked na-
tional differences would have occurred.
The French reaction was the most clear-
cut. They solved the dilemma by denying
both spontaneous generation and evolu-
tion. Indeed to the French, the seeming
disproof of spontaneous generation by Pas-
teur was one of the most telling arguments
they used against Darwin (6). The theory
of evolution was not legitimate, argued Er-
nest Faivre:
Neither by its principle, which is conjecture;
neither by its deductions which have no basis in
reality: neither by its proofs which are hardly
possible; neither by its two extreme conse-
quences which science as well as human dignity
forbid us from accepting: spontaneous genera-
tion and the intimate and degrading relationship
of man and brute (7).
More to the point, it seems fairly clear
that the French reaction to evolution and
spontaneous generation involved theologi-
cal and political factors. Since the middle
of the 18th Century, science had been a
weapon in the hands of the social critics.
Science, it was argued, was an agent of En-
lightenment and the enemy of Authori-
tarianism. As Condorcet remarked in his
Lettres d'un Theologien in 1773:
Any man who makes a profession of seeking
and announcing the truth, will always he odious
to those who exercise authority... The more men
are enlightened. the less those with authority can
abuse it. Thus truth is the enemy ofpower, as of
those who exercise it.
Not surprisingly, therefore, in the after-
math of the French Revolution many anti-
republican writers blamed these social cri-
tics and their ideas for the horrors of that
period . Naturally the ideas which they
found most repugnant and dangerous were
those with materialistic and atheistic over-
tones. <What a victory for materialism»,
Pasteur exclaimed in a public address in
1864:
If it could he affirmed that it rests on the estab-
lished fact that matter organizes itself takes on
life itself matter which has in it already all
known forces. Ah! If we could add to it this other
force which is called life... what would he more
natural than to deify such matter? Of what good
would it then he to have recourse to the idea of a
primordial creation ? To what good then would
he the idea of a Creator God (8).
Once we admit the possibility of spontan-
eous generation , Pasteur went on to warn
his audience , then it would be no more
surprising to learn also that beings <<trans-
form themselves and climb from rank to
rank , for example to insects after
10,000 years and no doubt to monkeys and
man after 100,000 years.>>
Such materialistic ideas obviously had
both political and theological overtones,
which was of particular significance during
the Second French Empire. After years of
political uncertainty , the Paris «mob>) had
once more exploded in the bloody June
riots of 1848. French society was once
again polarized ; in the words of Alexis de
Tocqueville it was a society o split in two:
those who possessed nothing united in a
common greed; those who possessed so-
mething in a common fear .>> In the after-
math of these riots, fear was also the driv-
ing force which turned the French middle
class towards the Catholic Church. The
Church stood for a stable social hierarchy
and social order. Church and State stood
shoulder to shoulder in face of the com-
mon enemy . During the Second Empire a
theological attack on church doctrine also
became a political attack on the State. The
choice, it seemed , lay between Louis Na-
poleon or othe complete ruin of France.>>
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The Church itself moved considerably to
the right . In the year that Pasteur had ad-
dressed the problem of materialism, Pope
Pius IX had issued his infamous encyclical
condemning any attempt by the Church to
compromise itself against forces of modern
liberalism . One such force was clearly the
doctrine of evolution . In 1862 the first
French translation of Darwin 's Origin of
Species had appeared, under the pen of
that notorious atheist , materialist and re-
publican , Clemence Royer.
Royer had made the political and theo-
logical implications of Darwin 's theory
abundantly clear . To her translation she
attached a lengthy preface in which the
Catholic Church was attacked with great
vehemence . It was a religion, she wrote,
((which was spread by an ignorant, domi-
neering, and corrupt priesthood.)) It was a
religion , she went on, ((which had put an
end to all possible progress of all science
and all philosophy)), and one which had
((impeded progress for fifteen centuries and
still does not cease to impede it in our dav))
(9). Materialism and evolution were highly
provocative terms to the French and spon-
taneous generation was intimately related
to both!
Against such a backdrop it is not sur-
prising that opponents of evolution and
spontaneous generation should have used
both theological and political arguments.
Neither is it surprising that the disproof of
spontaneous generation by Pasteur - at
least that is how the French interpreted
Pasteur ' s work - should have been seen as
powerful scientific and theological evi-
dence against the theory of evolution. As
the essayist Alfred Sudre remarked:
We find ourselves safeguarding the supernatural
origin of life, creation in the animal domain, the
permanence of types, the unity of humanity,
these great truths which form, so to say, the point
of intersection and the reciprocal sanctions ofthe
biological and the moral sciences (10).
Thus, it appears clear to me that the
choices made by French scientists over the
question of evolution , of spontaneous gen-
eration , and the relationships between the
two, reflected in part the theological and
political implications of these questions.
For as Louis Pasteur remarked , ((the fixity
of species, or the slow and progressive
transformation of one species into another;
the eternity of matter; the idea of a useless
God)), were the ((great problems)) of the
day (11). A French scientist simply could
not view the issue in a cold objective light,
anymore than modem Americans can calmly
discuss the sociobiology issue - too much
was at stake.
The dilemma of evolution and the origin
of life was resolved in totally different
ways by the British and Germans , since the
majority of them, unlike the French, came
to accept the evolutionary theory. For
their part , the British avoided the issue by
arguing that a belief in evolution was per-
fectly compatible with a belief in Divine
Creation . None other than Thomas Henry
Huxley remarked in 1860 that ((with re-
spect to the origin of this primitive stock, or
stocks , the doctrine of the origin of species
is obviously not necessarily concerned. The
transmutation hypothesis , for example, is
perfectly consistent either with the concep-
tion of a special creation o/the primitive
germ, or with the supposition of its having
arisen , as a modification of inorganic mat-
ter by natural causes )) ( 12). Neither the
French nor the Germans could accept such
an argument . That the British were able to
essentially avoid the issue reflects in part
the strong influence of Natural Theology
on their science, but more, I think, the
particular style of British science at that
time. The British were above all empiri-
cists following the inductive methods of
Francis Bacon and that view of science ex-
pressed in the famous dictum of Sir Isaac
Newton : Hypotheses non fingo. To even
consider the question of the origin of life
represented the type of absurd speculation
that had no place in science . They saw
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themselves as being concerned primarily
with hard facts. Charles Lyell, the famous
British geologist, was very anxious to dif-
ferentiate geology from cosmology. The
former, he wrote, ((investigates the succes-
sive changes that have taken place in the
organic and inorganic kingdoms of na-
ture, while the latter dealt with ((the ori-
gins of things)) (13). Scientists merely de-
scribed nature, or as The Times of London
put it, owe look to men ofscience rather for
observation than for imagination)). Alth-
ough, of course, this attitude did reflect a
certain philosophical viewpoint, the Bri-
tish were more prone to consider their
science as completely devoid of philoso-
phical influences.
Philosophical influences were, on the
other hand, the prime factor in the deve-
lopment of German scientists' answers to
the paradox of evolutionary theory and the
origin of life. Factor in the development of
evolutionary theory and the origin of life.
By the middle of the 19th Century, biolo-
gical sciences in Germany were dominated
by reductionist and mechanistic philoso-
phies. A widespread revulsion towards the
earlier speculative Naturphilosophie had
motivated the formation of the famous
Physical Society. The members of this so-
ciety, Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil du
Bois Reymond, Ernst Briicke and Karl
Ludwig, had joined together in 1847 in an
attempt to (<constitute physiology on a che-
mico-physical foundation and give it equal
rank with Physics.>) ((Physiologists must
expect to meet with an unconditional con-
formity to the law of the./brces of nature in
their inquiries respecting the vital pro-
cesses, remarked Helmholtz, ((they will
have to apply themselves to the investiga-
tions of the physical and chemical proces-
ses going on within the organism)) (14).
Initially they opposed the doctrine of
spontaneous generation because of its early
association with Naturphilosophie, but
with their acceptance of Darwin's theory
and their abhorrence of any theological ex-
planations in science, they came to view
the origin of life as oan exceedingly diffi-
cult mechanical problem.)) By the 1870's,
when the theory of spontaneous generation
had at last collapsed in Germany, this me-
chanical problem had become even more
difficult. In an attempt then to adhere to
their belief in physical causality, some of
them transferred their support to the doc-
trine of cosmozoa, the belief that life had
originated from germs entering the earth
from outer space. Such a belief, of course,
enabled them to deny the possibility of
spontaneous generation, while at the same
time accepting the evolutionary theory and
denying any Divine Creation.
Others of this general philosophical out-
look, however, refused to avoid the issue in
this way. They were forced to admit the
origin of life by a spontaneous generation.
To deny spontaneous generation)), Karl
von Nageli exclaimed, is to proclaim a
miracle.)) It was, as one remarked, an act
ofphilosophical faith)) (15).
This act of faith was also shared by Ernst
Haeckel and the more extreme school of
German materialists. This latter group,
made up of such notables as Ludwig
Buchner, Karl Vogt and Jacob Moleschott,
had shocked the sensitivities of the Victo-
rian age with such remarks as: ((thought is
secreted from the brain, as bile from the
liver or urine from the kidneys)). They had
also been the first to raise the question of
the origin of life. offevery organism is pro-
duced from parents, whence came the par-
ents?)) demanded Buchner in 1855. ((Could
they have arisen from the merely accidental
or necessary concurrence of external cir-
cumstances and conditions, or were they
created by an external power? And if the
first supposition be true, why does it not
happen today?)) (16). Why not indeed.
Although this last question was never real-
ly answered they continued to believe that
life must have originated by a spontaneous
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generation even though it seemed not to
occur at the present . Their particular
brand of materialism could accept no other
conclusion . The scientific evidence in op-
position to spontaneous generation was of
minor concern.
It seems fairly clear that the choices
made by 19th Century scientists about the
problem of spontaneous generation and
the origin of life involved a great deal more
than a simple objective evaluation of
scientific evidence. Political and theologi-
cal issues loomed large in France, while
philosophical issues were of paramount
significance in Germany . Neither ap-
proach managed to resolve the issne.
Scientists ignored the problem , as the Eng-
lish physiologist E. E. Schaefer remarked
in 1912, 'bv relegating its solution to some
former condition of the earths history,
when it is assumed, opportunities were ac
cidently favourable for the passage of inan-
imate matter into animate : such opportun-
ities, it is also assumed, having never re-
curred and being never likely to recur)
(17). That this view made little sense was
of little concern to most scientists. As Wil-
liam Preyer pointed out in 1880, if the
past had been so totally different from to-
day's conditions that spontaneous genera-
tion could have occurred , then the organ-
isms so produced would have perished in-
stantly. Life, as is well known, can only
exist over a very narrow range of environ-
mental conditions. If, on the other hand,
conditions in the past were quite similar to
those of today, then there is no reason why
spontaneous generation could not be a
constantly reoccurring phenomenon (18).
This totally illogical position became
even more precarious in the early decades
of the 20th Century. The issue was ignored
during the latter years of the 19th Century,
basically because even the most simple liv-
ing organism was considered to be ex-
tremely complex. The hiatus between life
and nonlife was so wide that it seemed im-
possible to bridge by any fortuitous meet-
ing of molecules. But between 1905 and
about 1930 the gap between life and non-
life narrowed to such an extent that there
appeared to be no discontinuity . Spontan-
eous generation once more became a feasi-
ble explanation for the origin of life, but at
the same time it became even more diffi-
cult to explain why spontaneous genera-
tion was not occurring at the present.
The nature of the simplest living form
and thus of the first living form was now
considered to be a piece of ' living matter)).
Life, it was realized in these years, could
be manifested at a level below the cell, and
the simplest forms of living matter were es-
sentially similar to inanimate matter.
This change in attitude towards life was
primarily the result of a new discipline,
biochemistry , that arose in the early years
of the 20th Century. While 19th Century
chemists were concerned with the separa-
tion and analysis of living protoplasm,
biochemists focused on the dynamic
aspects of cellular metabolism . Life was no
longer attributed to the structure and pro-
perties of protoplasm , but to the activities
of specific enzymes in a self- regulating
dynamic equilibrium . They pioneered the
'age of biocolloidology)), when colloidal
aggregates or micellae were thought to ex-
hibit properties essentially similar to living
processes . Thus, as one biochemist re-
marked in 1925 , the distinction between
primitive life and inorganic colloids was
merely a ' mental harrier,,. Workers in the
new field of virology tended to agree.
'Life)), remarked Felix-Hubert d'Herelle,
one of the early virologists best known for
his work on bacteriophages , 'does not re-
quire a cellular organization)). Instead 'it
results from a special physico-chemical
state of matter, that is the protein micella,
the smallest particle of matter in the colloid
state)) (19).
The spontaneous generation of these
colloidal aggregates obviously presented no
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problem to these early virologists and
biochemists. o When we seek to explain the
origin of life)), wrote Archibald Macallum,
professor of biochemistry at the University
of Toronto, we do not require to postulate
a highly complex organism)). It is merely
necessary to generate a colloidal particle,
which ((is in a definite sense, alive)) (20).
What precise form this ancestral living
matter took was never made clear. A
whole host of different entities was sug-
gested: an autocatalytic protein enzyme
perhaps, a piece of chromatin, a unimicel-
lar being, or even a moleculobiont. In
1926, the famous American geneticist H. J.
Muller argued that life did not occur be-
fore the gene, and that ((the first material
probably consisted of little else than the
gene or genes)). In the U.S.S.R. the bioche-
mist Aleksandr Oparin argued for the si-
milarity between colloids and protoplasm
and maintained life arose when the first gel
came out of a colloidal solution (21).
It is clear that this change in attitude to-
wards spontaneous generation was gener-
ated from within science itself, from viro-
logy and biochemistry. Moreover it also
reflected a strong reductionist tendency in
the sciences of that period. The sciences
were once again arranged in a hierarchy,
with physics at the base and the social
sciences at the apex. Every science drew its
explanations from those below. The social
sciences were reduced to the deterministic
laws of biology, and biological processes, it
was argued, could only be understood by
reducing them to their single isolated com-
ponent parts. Thus, as in the 19th Cen-
tury, life was thought to have arisen when
these parts came together by chance to
produce the first living material. But, alth-
ough such living matter was now thought
to be very simple, scientists were still very
reluctant to admit that it could be gener-
ated at the present. Biologists were thus
confronted with the same dilemma that had
faced them in 1859.
By the 1930 ' s however, the innate com-
plexity of living forms was once again
being stressed and reductionism was being
subjected to criticism . Taking an anti-
reductionist position , Oparin argued in
1936 that it was inconceivable that even
the simplest form of life could ((appear in
a very short time, before our eyes so to
speak , from unorganized organic solu-
tions)). Life did not appear spontaneously
when the last piece of machinery fell into
place, he argued , rather ((it must have re-
sulted from a long evolution of matter, its
origin being merely one step in the course
of its historical development .)) Life did not
arise in a moment , it emerged gradually
(22).
The concept of emergent evolution was
not unique to Oparin . Conwy Morgan and
others had discussed the phenomenon in
philosophical terms earlier in the century.
The mechanistic interpretation of life,
Morgan relates , ( regards life as a regroup-
ing ofphysico- chemical events with no new
kind of relatedness expressed in this inte-
gration )) Emergence occurs, on the other
hand , when new and unpredictable pheno-
mena arise as a result of combining separ-
ate elements . Thus, for example , the pro-
perties of protein molecules cannot be
foretold in advance by simply knowing the
properties of each constituent atom, they
are something essentially different (23).
What was so unique in Oparin ' s text of
1936, The Origin of Life, and the source
of its considerable impact, was the specific
details he presented for the stages of this
emerging process. It was far more than a
vague statement that ` life emerged'. The
transition between one stage and the next
could now be subjected to experimental
testing, and for the first time the origin of
life became a legitimate biochemical re-
search problem . Very soon after the end of
World War II, the usual manifestations of
a new research area appeared : the calling
of international conferences on the origin
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of life and the eventual appearance of a
journal devoted exclusively to this topic.
Indeed, most of the authors of the present
volume owe their professional status al-
most entirely to their work in this field.
Their debt to Oparin is immense. Oparin's
book, George Wald once remarked, upro-
vides the foundation upon which all of us
who are interested in this subject have
built)) (24).
But if this explains the general reaction
of biochemists to Oparin's work, it does
not explain much of the hostility expressed
towards it by biologists in other fields.
Neither does it explain the genesis of
Oparin's ideas. Here again extra-scientific
factors were involved (25).
Between 1927 and 1929 Stalin launched
his cultural, industrial and agricultural re-
volution, during which the control of
science passed into the hands of the Soviet
Communist Party. As a result, attempts
were made to build a new science of the
proletariat, dedicated to practical ends for
the benefit of the Soviet people. Oparin, in
1935, published a work dealing with the
biochemical basis of tea production, and
most infamous of all, Trofim Lysenko ad-
dressed himself to the problem of overnali-
zation)) of winter wheat. He announced in
1929 that wheat, normally planted in the
autumn and thus subject to severe winter
kill, would ripen after a spring planting if
subjected to moisture and low tempera-
tures immediately prior to planting (26).
At the same time many Soviet scientists
began a conscious reconstruction of their
science based on Friedrich Engels' dialecti-
cal materialism. During the 1930's Trofim
Lysenko, for example, used the rhetoric of
dialectical materialism to attack classical
Mendelian genetics, thereafter providing a
powerful weapon in the hands of those
who argue that ideology has no place in
science (27). Such critics have ignored the
fact that Oparin also utilized dialectical
materialism as a framework from which to
address the problem of the origin of life. In
Oparin's case, however, the arguments
were very persuasive and the results highly
successful.
The framework of dialectical materia-
lism led Oparin to view life as a complex
interaction of chemical processes and not
as the property of a specific chemically de-
fined substance. Thus he was opposed to
the idea that life arose when a specific
molecule came together by chance.
Through Engels' law of the Transforma-
tion of Quantity into Quality, he came to
view the beginning of life in terms of emer-
gence. Thus, as more and more complex
molecules developed, o the old laws ofphy-
sics and chemistry naturally continued to
operate, but now they were supplemented
by new and more complicated biological
laws which had not operated before)), and
which, of course, could not be predicted
from the properties of the isolated mole-
cules. As Harold F. Blum remarked in his
Time's Arrow and Evolution: «We must
abandon the idea of a definite moment of
origin and assume that a series of events
represents the beginning of life rather than
one definite point in this series.))
Biochemists in the 1950's were thus
faced with a choice between Oparin's hy-
pothesis of emergent evolution and the
older hypothesis that a living molecule
spontaneously arose by chance. How was
this choice made? Did Oparin's Marxist in-
terpretation play any role in subsequent
debates on the issue?
At first glance one might have expected
Western scientists to have reacted nega-
tively to Oparin, in the same way that they
responded to Lysenko. The cold war
loomed large in the 1950's, left wing dis-
senters were subject to personal harass-
ment as Senator McCarthy carried out his
vendetta against liberal elements in the
United States. Yet, in fact, American and
other Western biochemists became rapidly
converted to the Oparin thesis.
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As argued above, the reasons for this
conversion seem clear. For the first time
biochemists saw the origin of life question
as a legitimate scientific research problem
and reacted to Oparin on those terms. If
this implies that indeed scientists are total-
ly indifferent to any political ramifications
of their theories, one must temper it by
stating that they seemed totally unaware of
the Marxist basis of Oparin's theory. I was
myself exposed to Oparin's work as an un-
dergraduate in the 1950's, but neither my-
self, my peers, nor my instructors had the
least idea that Oparin was presenting a dia-
lectical argument. This was not because
Oparin in any way covered up his dialecti-
cal views. In a much revised and enlarged
version of his text, published in 1956, he
wrote:
A complete/v different prospect opens out before
us if we try to approach a solution to the prob-
lem dialectically rather than metaphysically, on
the basis of a study of the successive changes in
matter which preceded the appearance of life
and led to its emergence. Matter never remains
at rest, it is constantly moving and developing...
Life thus appears as a particular very compli-
catedform of the motion of matter, arising as a
new property at a definite stage in the general
development of matter (28).
We remained unaware, I think, because of
total ignorance of dialectical materialism.
Few Anglo-Saxon scientists these days
know anything about philosophy, let alone
Marxist philosophy. Why should they? If
science is free of extra-scientific influences,
then a scientist's training need not include
any. Thus in the West, «two cultures))
have arisen! I did not become aware of the
basis of Oparin's views until reading Loren
Graham's Science and Philosophy in the
Soviet Union, published in 1972. Indeed,
the reaction to my own recently published
book on the history of the spontaneous
generation controversy has led me to con-
clude that it was the vehicle by which
many scientists first learned of Oparin's
approach. One cannot, therefore, refrain
from wondering how these biochemists
would have reacted to Oparin in the
1950's had they known.
But one group of Western - trained scien-
tists did oppose Oparin ' s work . These were
the geneticists and phage workers, who op-
posed Oparin not in reaction to his Marx-
ist views, but because he was a supporter
of Lysenko . This group tended to agree
with H. J. Muller , when he wrote : (< All ma-
terial in the organism is made subsidiary to
the genetic material , and the origin of life
is identified with the origin of this material
by chance chemical combination)) (29).
They tended to couple Oparin ' s views
with those of Lysenko , believing both to
represent a threat to the validity of classi-
cal Mendelian genetics . The maintenance
of status has always been an important
motivation of choice ! This immediately
takes on political overtones . The Soviet
Communist Party had banned teaching and
research in classical genetics as part of its
ideological support for Lysenkoism, and
Muller had visited the Soviet Union in
1933 only to become a life-long opponent
of Stalinism and Lysenkoism . As late as
1966 Muller had described the books of
the (Lysenkoist Oparin )) as apart ofthe at-
tempt to down -rate the significance of
genetics)) (30).
The Lysenko controversy was very
much evident during the first International
Symposium on the Origin of Life which
took place in Moscow in 1957. For exam-
ple, Wendell Stanley ' s paper (( On the na-
ture of viruses , genes ad lived, in which he
had argued that with nucleic acids awe are
dealing with life itself)), was attacked by the
Soviet geneticist Nikolai Nuzhdin. Stan-
ley's paper , Nuzhdin argued, represents
((the ever- growing tendency to ignore the
qualitative specificity of living material
which distinguishes it from non - living ma-
terial, a tendency which entered biology
as a result of the work of physicists who
((consider the possibility of a more com-
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plete explanation of biological phenomena
.solely in terms of their understanding of
the laws of physics and chemistry.>> Nuzh-
din, it need hardly be mentioned, ((had
paid much attention to the problems of the
struggle with anti- Michurinist distortions
of biology, constantly criticizing various
idealistic trends in the study of variation
and heredity>) (31).
I hope my brief discussion has con-
vinced the reader that the historical back-
ground to our present interest in the origin
of life is more complex than most scientists
believe and perhaps like to believe. The
story of the spontaneous generation debate
illustrates the falsity of the claim that
science is a product of scientific geniuses
whose ideas are generated solely from wit-
hin science itself. In the words of a recent
reviewer, the spontaneous generation story
is one of ((biology, medicine, theology, me-
taphysics and politics, a panorama of
scientific thought and work, a medley of
earnest Christians, devoted atheists, and
agnostics, convinced or conforming Marx-
istss (32).
In the past, people felt strongly about
the issue of spontaneous generation, as
they now feel strongly about racial inequa-
lities. In both cases the intensity of belief
went far beyond what legitimately could be
held on scientific grounds alone. If our
18th and 19th Century ancestors did not
throw water at each other, that merely re-
flects a cultural difference between Euro-
peans and modern Americans. Personally I
would prefer drying clothes than being
subject to these biting words of Henri
Milne Edwards:
When the savage tribes of one of those isolated
oceanic islands saw shipwrecked sailors for the
first time, they thought that these strangers were
descendedfrom heaven, or like fishes, had arisen
from the sea-bed. They did not stop to think that
they came from an unknown island beyond the
horizon. Partisans of spontaneous generation
seem to me to reason in the same manner as
those ignorant islanders.
E. H. Carr, in his book What is History,
points out that history is never and cannot
be a description of reality. It is made by
historians . Thus to study history one must
((study the historian before you study his
writings.)> Likewise, it seems to me,
science is made by scientists. To fully un-
derstand a scientific theory one must also
first understand the scientist who proposed
the theory and the milieu in which he ex-
isted. Although the results of such inquir-
ies may well be somewhat abhorrent to the
ideologies of modem scientists, I hope they
will at least withhold judgement until, in
their own words, all thc.lacts are in)).
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